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migrants in Tahiti, French Polynesia 
 
- Laura Schuft 
URMIS, Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis & Université de la Polynésie Française 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes the discourse on social integration and ethnic representations of French 
civil servants working short and long term in Tahiti, French Polynesia. Appointed to positions 
in education, public administration and law and order by the mainland authority, the attitudes 
and social interactions of this community compose a dynamic element of ethnic identity 
formation in Tahiti. Habitually the literary and academic voice on Polynesian culture and 
history, the discourse of this dominant socio-economic category is herein redefined as the 
object of sociological study. Analysis reveals three principle ideal type attitudes toward ethnic 
representations and relations, each positioned differently around reactions to and 
interpretations of their social role as mainland civil servants in French Polynesia. Similarities 
of these migrants’ identity strategies with those of migrants elsewhere suggest that these self-
preservation identity strategies are inherent to negative stigma rather than dependent on socio-
economic status or duration of stay. 
**** 
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Sociological and anthropological research regarding French Polynesia has traditionally 
constructed its object around the “exotic” Polynesian customs and traditions, omitting study 
on the cohabiting French population. The Occidental perspective on indigenous and 
subordinated peoples - “isolated tribes in exotic lands, colonised peoples… dominated classes 
and groups” - remains the encouraged object of fieldwork in these disciplines. According to 
one student fieldwork guide for example, dominant groups are considered difficult subject 
matter, better equipped to dodge the ethnographer’s scrutiny (Beaud & Weber 1998: 8, 10). 
Yet such principles construct marginal groups as “exotic” and concurrently disqualify the 
social processes and discourse of “dominant” social categories, just as racial minorities in the 
United States were once constructed as exotic “ethnics” fit for academic analysis, as opposed 
to majority “non-ethnic” Whites1. In rejection of this exoticism which removes “dominant” 
discourse from sociological analysis, this study places the elite migrants of Tahiti, the 
“dominant” French civil servants, at the centre of analysis2.  
Although the European population has figured in a few studies regarding the colonial 
period, such as Farani Taioro (Panoff 1981) or Tahiti Colonial (1860-1914) (Toullelan 1987), 
the contemporary mainland population is the topic of rare publications (Saura 1998; Brami-
Celentano 2002) which nonetheless do not directly address this population’s own discourse 
and representations. Yet as “to speak of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd as to 
speak of the sound from one hand clapping”3, analysis of French Polynesia’s mainland 
community, whose pens have traditionally recounted “Polynesian” society, is integral to the 
study of the latter. Furthermore, the French presence has primarily been referred to within the 
mythical context of ideal racial mélange and utopian society (Panoff 1989; Toullelan & Gille 
1992; Doumenge 1999). Nonetheless, regardless of the ample racial amalgamation over the 
past two centuries between European, Polynesian and Chinese peoples in particular, the 
construction and maintenance of ethnic categorization persist. 
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This article considers relations between “Polynesian” and “French”4 individuals through 
French civil servants’ discourse on their social integration5 within Tahitian society, as well as 
their portrayal of their own ethnicity and that of the host population. French civil servants 
(fonctionnaires) are the focal point of this study, as their presence and function in this French 
overseas Territory are an extension of the colonial mission to convey elements of French 
society within the domains of education, public administration and law and order. Within the 
migratory structure of temporary “elite” migrations from the “former”6 colonial power, this 
article considers the discourse of short and long-term civil servant migrants in the urban 
metropolis of Tahiti7. The political and social context faceting the attitudes of mainland civil 
servants within Tahitian society shall herein be outlined, followed by an analysis of the 
attitudes themselves and the unexpected emotional and psychological similarities of these 
attitudes with those of other migratory populations. 
 
Socio-political factors 
 
Elite temporary migrations: exacerbating the ethnic divide  
 
In addition to the centralised State mission bestowed upon expatriated civil servants, two 
particular characteristics qualify these migrants in French Polynesia: elite status and 
temporary residence. The elite status is implicit to the State’s colonial mission of exporting 
know-how through trained expatriates, in that these individuals occupy influential 
administrative, educational and law enforcement positions within a small-scale social and 
economic framework. Moreover, elevated socio-economic status is assured by the substantial 
salary increase of 40 to 120% allotted to civil servants expatriated in French Polynesia (Prel 
2003: 5). Bernard Poirine noted in 1992 that, according to national surveys (ITSTAT 1988), 
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economic differences in French Polynesia were largely ethnically divided, situation which 
exacerbated latent ethnic tensions. He noted that although “European and assimilated” 
households made up only 20% of the total household number, their heads of household 
represented 72% of upper intellectual and management professions. On the contrary, the 
“Polynesian” households, 58% of the total, constituted only 10% of the upper intellectual and 
management professions, and 82% of all farmers and 76% of blue collar workers (Poirine 
1992: 21). Posterior surveys, though void of ethnic categorization8, seem to display similar 
statistics, showing for example that of the working population born outside of French 
Polynesia, more than three quarters occupied positions in superior sectors9. Such ethnically 
divided economic differences greatly determine the representations and integration of the 
mainland migrants and contribute to the ethnic categorization that is reflected in the 
Mainlanders’ discourse. 
These migrations are also predominantly temporary. The expatriate status currently allows 
a maximum stay of four years for the approximate 2000 State positions in French Polynesia10. 
Rare exceptions include candidates who apply for and are granted the maintenance of their 
positions in French Polynesia, as well as judges and university professors, who are appointed 
to their positions indefinitely. This structure of temporary positions creates a “turntable” of 
civil servant arrivals which, generating constant newcomers from the French mainland, 
contributes to the perception of Mainlanders as “foreign” and “outsider”. 
 
Invasions 
  
Along with cultural change and economic activity, migrations from mainland France 
multiplied exponentially following the 1963 installation of the Centre of Nuclear 
Experimentation (CEP). These migrations therefore are occasionally interpreted as invasions. 
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As note Toullelan and Gille in reference to the French presence in French Polynesia, “it is 
evident that since the beginning of time, the universal phenomenon of migration is presented 
in its most brutal form, that of invasion” (Toullelan & Gille 1999: 9). Bruno Saura, for 
example, speaks of an increased sentiment of “invasion” due to the opening of charter flights, 
which translated increased migration and contact from mainland France (Saura 1998: 83).  
Jean-Marc Regnault also refers to the “myth” of an invasion in Polynesia by the mainland 
French whom are viewed as “foreigners”. Regnault highlighs the political discourse of Oscar 
Temaru, leader of the Independence Party Tavini huiraatira, who denounced the dangers of 
immigration from Europe and referred to the French immigration policy as a “whitening 
policy” or a “slow genocide”11. Whether a widespread vision or one launched by the political 
movement, the association between “migration” and “invasion” testify to the existence of this 
sentiment which, regardless of numeric or symbolic reality, also affect the social relations and 
attitudes of the migrants themselves. 
 
Integration, assimilation, domination  
 
France has adopted an “assimilationist” model of integration for its immigrants and 
Overseas Territories, as opposed to countries which advocate a “multiculturalist” model of 
society which celebrates diversity (cf. Bertheleu 1997). In this concept, in which “Integration” 
and “assimilation” are synonymous, prevails the definition of the latter: “the policy of 
incorporating migrants into society through a one-sided process of adaptation” (Castles 1997: 
7).   Although boasting equality through equal education, the assimilationist model however 
paradoxically creates a new inequality between dominant and subordinate cultures. “If 
equality is translated by a negation of differences and thus of individual identities, it actually 
creates a new inequality, as it takes the values of a dominant group as a universal model” (De 
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Carlo 1998: 39). Assimilation politics therefore assume social domination of a socially 
reproduced national norm, conveyed most notably through school and language.  
The assimilation of French Polynesian residents into the French linguistic and cultural 
model has been promoted through the State school system and the recruitment of French civil 
servants into the socio-professional roles of teachers and agents of administration, law and 
order. Since the beginning of the French colonial emprise in the Polynesian islands, the role of 
these agents has been to convey knowledge and socio-cultural values and symbols, 
particularly through social reproduction in the school. Pierre Bourdieu revealed the symbolic 
pedagogical violence exerted by the dominant class who maintains their dominant social 
position through the reproduction within the classroom of society’s inequalities (Bourdieu & 
Passeron 1970: 21-22).  This hypothesis is applicable to French Polynesia’s pedagogical 
system whose 1883 transplantation, when the Jules Ferry laws made primary school 
obligatory for all French citizens including those in the colonies, was considered what Ferry 
termed the “educational and civilizing mission belonging to the superior race” (De Carlo 
1998: 19).   The school system, or “l’école du citoyen”12, was thus a means of instilling the 
values and culture of a dominant French civilization to the “uncivilised” and “inferior” race. 
Polynesian languages, for example, were strictly banned from usage in schools until 1980, at 
which time the Tahitian language was officially recognised (Baré 2002: 26). By imposing the 
dominant language with all its imbedded cultural symbols, the school system thus participated 
in maintaining the social dominance of the mainland French. 
 
The image of the Popa’a 
 
Often referred to in racial terms as Popa’a, White in Tahitian language, Mainlanders are 
said to be frequently viewed by Tahitians as individualistic and lacking generosity (Saura 
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1998: 83). This image is reinforced by actual economic advantages in favour of expatriated 
mainland civil servants, including salary increases, expatriation bonuses, housing subventions 
and travel compensations. For this reason, the anti-French “allergy” is, according to 
ethnologist Bruno Saura, especially demonstrated against the “passing military and State 
agents who have come to Polynesia to save money thanks to the atomic bomb and who do not 
even spend their high salaries within the local economy” (in Regnault 1995: 145). This harsh 
perception represents civil servants’ primary interest as the financial advantages. The 
expatriation system has thus fed these images through its creation of what results in ethnically 
delineated economic divisions. 
 
Colonial shame 
 
Another factor affecting and subsequently emerging from the civil servants’ discourse is 
colonial shame, extending to guilt related to French nuclear testing in the islands (1966-1995). 
The ensuing imagery divides social actors into “the Parisian State agent” and the local 
Polynesian victim “who suffered at the hand of the State and its agents” (Doumenge 2002: 
29).  Saura also refers to ongoing colonial representation, stating that the Frenchman is seen 
first and foremost as coloniser (Saura 1998: 86).  The colonial view of Mainlanders incite 
differing reactions from the interviewees who either take the defence of “the Parisian State 
agent” or the “indigenous victim”, or feel caught between justifying and criticizing their own 
affiliation with colonial history. 
 
The ideal types 
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Selected for their maximum diversity in age, family status and personality, the mainland 
civil servants interviewed held occupations within three different public institutions:  an 
elementary school, the State police and the university. Of the selected interviewees, were 
compared those civil servants whose length of stay in French Polynesia was limited (four 
years maximum) with those migrants who were able and had chosen to stay longer (over six 
years). The comparison allowed observation of the impact of duration of stay upon the 
perceived integration, ethnic representations and overall discourse within the French civil 
servant population.  
The interviews are organised into ideal types as defined by Max Weber, in which 
exaggerated archetypal forms of classification are employed to categorise otherwise elusive 
concepts or phenomena into easily conceptualised forms for analysis (Weber 1996: 412).  The 
ideal types demonstrated by the actors of migration have been broken into three principle 
attitude types concerning discourse on ethnic representations and varying sentiments of 
acceptance, belonging and social integration within Tahitian society.  The three major 
categories of informants embodying these attitudes are: the embittered patriot, the proudly 
integrated and the laissez-faire fatalist. 
 
1. The embittered patriot 
 
The first ideal type, the embittered patriot, is characterised by a general rejection of the 
Polynesian. The inability to feel integrated within Tahitian society creates social discomfort 
and frustration which is transformed into bitterness toward Polynesians who “are not 
welcoming” as had been imagined. Feeling unjustly rejected for one’s ethnic belonging 
whereas “Tahiti is part of France”, the rejection of the Other is all the more justified. In 
parallel, the embittered patriot displays increased patriotism toward mainland France and 
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accuses Polynesians of profiteering from this privilege, claiming that the latter “do not 
recognise their privileges” and are “spoiled children”. Their discourse thus evokes a solid 
boundary between the mainland French “us” and the Polynesian “them”. 
 
Contested rejection 
 
 The feeling of unfair rejection, injustice and racism toward the French mainlanders is 
of the foremost themes of the embittered patriot. An interviewee from the university, whom 
we shall call Anne, laments: 
“With the police, there is a dual system… A Polynesian pulled over doesn’t get a 
ticket… People died [in France] for their ideas, that the laws should be the same for 
all. In the private sector we feel discriminated… The [Tahitian] language is an 
excuse. It’s not fair. A Polynesian in Nantes is not obliged to speak Breton… [The 
Polynesians] are living with my tax money…Coming here is a right. They have you 
come because they need you, but it’s your right to come” (Anne) 
National values and patriotic conviction are evoked to defend the unfair rejection.  The right 
to equality is supported by citizenship in a country founded upon its fought-for Constitution 
and by rights as a tax-payer supporting the French-funded Territory.  Patriotic ties are thus 
strengthened in response to feeling treated as a foreigner in a place where expectation dictates 
should be “home.” Adding that the French system prescribes migration of Mainlanders toward 
Polynesia, Anne accepts even less any complaints against Mainlanders from Polynesians who, 
on the contrary, she esteems should be appreciative. 
Also in her third year of employment in Tahiti, an interviewee from the Middle School 
confirms the existence of racism against Mainlanders: 
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 “The Popa’a are not welcome here… It’s evident even in politics… The racism is 
rather surprising… They don’t accept you because they think that you shouldn’t be 
here” (Bert) 
He places the fault on Polynesians, guilty of the rejection:  
“At first we socialised with Polynesians.  But we stopped. We realized that it was 
useless. They really take advantage. We invited the same people several times and 
were never invited back” (Bert) 
Bert thus feels unfairly rejected and discriminated against. An interviewee from the national 
police, in his fourth year in Tahiti, also feels targeted by racism and evokes in this case the 
accusation of colonialism: 
 “We’re beginning to see racist remarks. For example here a Mainlander is called a 
Popa’a, and when you see the definition of Popa’a, in the end it translates the 
coloniser aspect. In other words… that person is a coloniser, he steals my work, he 
helps himself, and then he leaves. Or else he stays, but he takes my spot” (Christophe) 
Rejection of the Mainlander is thus associated with a negative colonial image, which the 
interview associates directly with the racial designation popa’a. A husband and wife, who 
both teach at the Middle School as of two years, evoke similar feelings: 
“There’s a boundary… We are perceived somewhat as invaders; but in fact you come 
to realize that the Polynesians are not from here either. It’s a mix… no one is ‘from 
here’” (Donald) 
The feeling of being perceived as invaders is again coupled with unfairness, in this case 
because the ethnic categorisations construct the descendants of previous foreigners as 
“Polynesian”, or “from here”, whereas he and his wife are treated as outsiders. His wife, 
Deborah, also attests to a “boundary” despite their efforts: 
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“Regarding invitations, we are mostly invited by people like us… who are here for a 
defined time. We have not had an invitation from a resident for example. We have 
however made the effort to invite… But with no return” (Deborah) 
Like other embittered patriots, Deborah complains of lack of reciprocity, which strengthens 
her conviction that the rejection and social barriers come from the “other”. 
For François, the rejection is again accompanied by the image of the Popa’a as invader, 
leading to the feeling of being unjustly discriminated: 
“There is a certain rejection of the Popa’a… who takes our land… our work… No. If 
we have someone on a job it’s because there is no one else, because you are more 
competitive than another…. So there is this sort of reverse racism” (François) 
The image of Mainlanders as invading profiteers is once again emphatically contested as a 
false and unfair reason of differential treatment. Also at the university as of many years, 
Geraldine also attests to the presence of racism, particularly on the job: 
“When someone wants to apply for a job, if he is not Polynesian, he has no chance… 
I know a few examples of young people who were born here because their grand-
parents moved here and who are unemployed because they are not… of Polynesian 
stock” (Geraldine) 
She also sites her own place of work, where she herself feels victim of discriminations: 
“At work, there is segregation between the Polynesians and the non-Polynesians, 
even if you may have good relations with certain colleagues… And at the smallest 
disagreement, the French are often accused of racism, but I think that the racism is 
especially in the other direction” (Geraldine) 
Geraldine thus sees the accusation of racism as unprovoked and as participating in reverse 
racism, in which Mainlanders are the victims. 
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“Tahiti, c’est la France!” 
 
The injustice of perceived rejection and racism is reinforced by the fact that equality for 
Mainlanders should prevail, as “Tahiti is France” (“Tahiti, c’est la France”). To the question 
regarding the term “expatriate”, the embittered patriot contests this expression with vigour. 
The following extract clearly expresses this sentiment regarding French proprietorship and 
belonging: 
“It is part of France. It’s French, French Polynesia. The term ‘expatriate’ is 
surprising… Polynesia is French, so I thought I was at home. For me, I was headed to 
discover a part of my country that I didn’t know… And when I feel, not a rejection, 
but a mistrust regarding the Popa’a… I wonder, what’s going on, this is my home… I 
am in France… I am expatriated in the sense that I am thousands of kilometres from 
the Mainland” (Deborah) 
Despite the social interactions that bring her understand the contrary, Deborah insists on 
considering herself at home in France, justifying this claim and contesting all unfair rejection. 
Others echo this feeling, such as “Expatriate? No, I am not outside of my country here” 
(Bert), or more strongly: 
“Expatriated? Here? No, I am French… This is a French university in the Pacific… 
There is no reason that I should be considered expatriated here… Is a Tahitian, when 
he goes to Paris, an expatriate?… I am from the South of France; I like the South of 
France… like the Polynesians in Polynesia” (François) 
The overly defensive attitude is recurrent in the embittered patriot, who emphatically justifies 
his presence and social role in Polynesia and strongly rejects any questioning of the 
legitimacy of his presence as a Mainlander in Tahiti. 
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The Polynesian, spoiled by the Mainland 
 
Another recurring theme with the embittered patriot ideal type, and which is a long-
present stereotype (Rigo 1997: 75), is the image of the Polynesian as a “spoiled child”, with 
whom the Mainland has been too generous. In his fourth and final year at the university, 
Henry declares: 
“There is a total lack of understanding about what goes on in France… They don’t 
know their privileges; they are spoiled children” (Henri) 
The indifference toward France is reproached in light of the privileges provided by the 
Mainland. Another interviewee sees exploitation of France’s generosity, claiming that “they 
take from France only what they want” (Anne). Yet another attributes the cheerfulness of 
Polynesians to the economic and medical benefits provided by the Mainland: 
“There are many Polynesians who should take a trip to Fiji. They would see how good 
things are here... Because when you hear certain negative discourse, and when you see a 
country like Fiji – you see, they got their independence – but it’s terrible… Here the 
people smile… I think to myself, maybe they should take a look over there so they 
realize that this is a rich island…. Look at all the medical coverage which is provided 
by the Mainland” (Elise) 
The leisure of Polynesians is coupled with their ingratitude, demonstrated by their desire for 
independence. Her colleague echoes this feeling: 
“Here, compared to Africa, there is everything. And the people, the Polynesians, are 
not aware in my opinion of the richness and the happiness they have. They are 
assisted… social security for everyone” (François) 
Whereas a Mainlander is assumed an appreciative or rightful benefactor, the Polynesian is 
accused of not appreciating the happiness assured by the Mainland. 
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These reproaches accompany the defensive patriotism vis-à-vis an exemplary Mainland. 
The defensive assertions rejecting colonial shame, one interviewee goes as far as to deny 
colonial history, declaring: 
“They were not colonized… They were evangelized. It’s not their fault… Why did 
we come to disturb them? We brought sickness, even if we also brought civilisation” 
(Hélène) 
This amalgam of contradictory ideas reveals guilt for having disturbed the Polynesians, 
who are innocent (“it’s not their fault”), and for having brought sickness. Yet at the same time 
she denies the colonisation and boasts the well-doings of the Mainland, which “brought 
civilisation”. Employing “we”, she also directly associates herself with the actors of French 
colonial history. 
In response to a question strictly regarding the term “expatriate”, François displays 
stronger emotion concerning colonial guilt: 
“Do I feel guilty for having colonised Polynesia? Not at all… Do I feel guilty for 
having colonised Africa? Not at all. Such is history… Do the Italians feel guilty 
because the Romans colonised Europe? Not at all. Do the English feel guilty for 
having gone to America…? … I have no guilt. None” (François) 
The term “expatriate” seems to evoke great insult as well as the idea of colonialism, 
responsibility for which he aggressively distances himself. Having lived in Algeria until its 
independence, this informant then links colonial history directly to independence struggles, 
which he belittles: 
“If the Polynesians are intelligent enough to understand that in the middle of the 
ocean all alone with 240,000 inhabitants… they would be subjugated to other 
powers… It would no longer be the French who give the money. Because France 
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gives a lot of money … They’ll have to get to work straight away. The hotels have to 
be cleaned up… I don’t see the point [of being independent]” (François) 
Mainland France is once again praised, whereas the local intelligence and motivation to work 
are questioned.  
 
Disappointment 
 
A final theme of the embittered patriot involves the disappointment of Tahiti not being as 
“French” or as paradisiacal as expected. Some had imagined “the myth… images of warmth, 
the lagoon… the mythical idea” but were “quickly disappointed… Day-to-day life had 
nothing to do with that… The people are not welcoming” (Anne). Another informant makes 
similar comments:  
“I had the image of an easy life, the beach, coconut trees, the kindness of the people. 
It’s not at all like that … In Tahiti it’s the same life as anywhere… we are 
disappointed. I expected an easy life, but it’s rather hard. There are traffic jams… it’s 
like a Parisian lifestyle!” (Bert) 
For the latter, having imagined a mythical and paradisiacal place, the disappointment is tied to 
the banality or the demystification of the island.  
The disappointment from unmet expectations contributes to the “effect of bitterness”, in 
which the “European has lost his illusions; he was hoping to encounter the noble savage” 
(Rigo 1997: 161).  The disillusionment from unmet expectations, resulting in the emotional 
reaction of bitterness, is reminiscent of Pierre Livet’s claim that emotions are signals of alarm 
which let us know that our desires or expectations are maladjusted to the reality around us 
(Livet 2002). The disparity between expectations and reality is also pertinent to Emile 
Durkheim’s notion of “anomie” in which a malaise is provoked when “society fails to provide 
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a limiting framework of social norms” (Jary 1991: 21).   The discrepancy between expectation 
and actual social experience can clearly lead to a communal emotional response, as 
demonstrate the embittered patriot.  
 
2. The proudly integrated 
 
The opposite extreme of the above category is the proudly integrated migrant. Having 
accepted the criticism toward the mainland French and the colonial shame, rather than 
denying it, the proudly integrated utilises a different strategy of identity preservation by 
distancing himself from other Mainlanders. Claiming that other Mainlanders “are there to put 
money aside”, have a “colonialist mentality” or “live in their little world”, the proudly 
integrated claims to “not create relationships with Popa’a”. Considering himself an exception 
to the majority of Mainlanders, he continually tries to distinguish himself from this ethnic 
belonging and its negative associations. This reaction thus involves pride as to one’s 
successful integration amongst Polynesians, as opposed to other Mainlanders who have, 
allegedly, failed due to a lack of will or to personal or cultural characteristics. 
 
Adoption of the negative perception of Popa’a 
 
Firstly, the proud integrated accepts the negative perception of Popa’a.  This national 
policeman, in his third year in Tahiti and married to a Polynesian woman met in 1989 during 
a previous military stay at the site of the nuclear testing centre, shares a negative image of 
Popa’a: 
“They are here to put money aside… I don’t like the mentality of taking all, then 
leaving. Especially the military try to save the maximum… There is still a problem of 
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integration in the colonial style, like the teachers. The teachers have often lived in 
Africa. They are used to being served… to paying little for services … They have 
created segregation… The teachers don’t mix with others… they feel superior to 
others” (Isaac) 
His reproaches include the image of profiteers who have come with their superior and 
colonialist attitudes only to put money aside. He displays disdain for Popa’a, particularly 
military and teachers who are accused of intentionally separating themselves socially from 
Polynesians. 
Another policeman, a few years into his stay in Tahiti and hoping to remain there with his 
Polynesian girlfriend, shares the same reproaches concerning Popa’a. 
“And the Popa’a who have been in Polynesia for a number of years… think they are 
superior to Polynesians… For them, they are the Popa’a, the Whites, and they are the 
ones who command... Generally they are retired people who worked in the 
administrations. They stay in Polynesia and because they have a higher salary, they 
have a nice house… They have a superior quality of life. They don’t try to form 
relationships. They’re in their little world” (Jacques) 
The superiority and the disdainful regard, stemming from the socially and economically 
superior position, are once again among the negative images adopted. Retirees and long-term 
migrants are again criticised for lacking will to “form relationships” with Polynesians and for 
staying “in their little world”. The logic of this accusation is nonetheless contradicted in 
further commentary highlighting the interviewee’s “luck” in meeting Polynesians, revealing a 
paradox in the representation of Popa’a. He states: “Myself I was lucky – well, I’m very 
sociable as well – to form relationships, to be invited into families”. He later repeats: “Myself, 
I was lucky to have a friend who was here and through him I was able to meet other people, 
some Polynesians that he knew” (Jacques). Highlighting the fact that it is not easy to get to 
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know Polynesians, he thus attributes his own achievement to both “luck” and his own 
sociability, both of which distinguish him from other Mainlanders.  
Another proudly integrated, in Tahiti as of twelve years and whose wife is also in the civil 
service, likewise criticises his own ethnic group: 
“Many especially among the teachers… haven’t got a single Polynesian friend; they 
practically kept on as if they were in the Mainland. They only socialize with French, 
Whites, Mainlanders… It’s up to us, when arriving from the Mainland, to take the first 
step. You see right away if you are accepted or not. You don’t say, I am a teacher, I 
know everything. No. You must remain humble… I don’t socialize much with teachers; 
just a few. They are worthless… They want money… They save up. That way when 
they return to France they buy the nice home… Ourselves, all the money we earn, we 
spend it here, in the Territory… We have two colleagues, they’ve been here for two 
years and they are not going to renew their contract. They don’t like it here… In France, 
people don’t like to travel” (Kevin) 
Kevin furthers the idea that other Popa’a are not socially integrated amongst the Polynesians 
because they make no effort, criticizing them for this lack of will.  He particularly targets 
teachers, who are seen once again as profiteers, and even criticised for their desire to return to 
mainland France. Naturally, having embraced this negative representation of Popa’a, he also 
invests much dialogue in distancing himself and his wife from the “ethnic group” he 
describes, employing “they” to criticize other Popa’a, and “we” to speak of himself and his 
family. 
Two other colleagues from the elementary school, both in Tahiti since their teens, and 
whose parents were civil servants at the time, share these critiques of French teachers. One 
admits that her image of other teachers is “not very positive” and declares that her “true 
friends are Polynesians” (Lorna). The other elaborates this “not very positive” image: 
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“some only come for the money… and say we are the best, what we think is good, 
what Tahitians think is not good… There are people who still function in a colonial 
system… They are never happy. They never give five extra minutes… They earn 
nearly twice as much as what they earn in France, they have holidays … But they 
criticize. The students here are adorable… When you see people who are well-paid 
and who come with their theatrics… they might as well stay home… Their salaries 
are multiplied by 1.84… And personally I know Tahitians who struggle, who have no 
money, who live poorly, simply… That is why myself I was anti-popa’a before” 
(Marie) 
The “colonial” attitude is once again evoked, as well as the superiority and discontent despite 
economic privileges, the latter of which are presumed to be the reason of stay in Polynesia. 
This out-spoken image of teachers is common among the proudly integrated and, as is 
perceptible in the term “anti- popa’a”, is once again extended to generalise the entire ethnic 
group.  
 
Distancing from Popa’a, identifying with Polynesians 
 
The proudly integrated separates himself from the negative stigma notably by attaching 
his self-image to the Polynesian people and culture. Isaac, married to a Polynesian woman, 
distinguishes himself from other Mainlanders by his mixed marriage: 
“I am in favour of positive discrimination. Tahitians with equal qualifications should 
be favoured…  I would have no right to stay if it weren’t for my wife” (Isaac) 
As opposed to the embittered patriot, he applauds differential rights for Tahitians and claims 
preferential rights associated with this group of belonging thanks to his wife. In addition, he 
claims “We are at home” and identifies with Tahiti as a political entity, stating “We are 
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headed toward Independence”, as opposed to the embittered patriot who employs “we” to 
refer to mainland France.  
Jacques, who had attributed his integration in Polynesia to “luck”, distinguishes himself 
from other Mainlanders by his adventurous character, which he affirms throughout the 
interview: 
 “I live it as an adventurer. You know… [in Tahiti] there will not be all the same 
commodities as in the Mainland … That is why I said you have to be somewhat 
adventurous to come… I am an adventurer, and material things don’t attract me. So 
that is why, concerning integration, there is no problem. But I have colleagues who 
can’t get adjusted” (Jacques) 
He claims that whereas some colleagues are unable to adjust, his own adventurous character 
allows him to integrate, thus distinguishing himself from other Mainlanders. He continues: 
“Myself, I do not form relationships with Popa’a, with Whites. Myself, I have greater 
ease in forming relationships with Polynesians” (Jacques) 
Not only is his personality different from other Mainlanders, but he also does not associate 
with the latter, preferring to associate with Polynesians. At the Middle School, Kevin also 
wishes to identify with Polynesians and to distance himself from Mainlanders: 
 “Many Polynesians are convinced that I was born here; because I have the accent of 
pieds noirs13”. He later continues, “Many people, parents, think I was born here. 
Because I speak with an accent, I speak a lot, I speak with my hands” (Kevin) 
He underlines his natural similarities with Polynesians, demonstrating satisfaction to be often 
taken as a native of the Territory. Yet when associated with Mainlanders, he exhibits 
rejection: 
“A Farani is someone born in France.  I was not born in France…  Farani is 
Mainlander…  There is a colleague who just renewed his contract to stay here. And he 
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wants to make others think that he is from here… and when he sees a White, he says, 
‘hey, hello Farani’.  So the last time, I said, that’s enough: I am not Farani because I 
wasn’t born in France” (Kevin) 
In this “competition” of integration, each wishes to be associated with the Territory and to be 
considered an exception from other Farani. He continues his dissociation from the latter in 
favour of association with Polynesians, displaying pride in his integration: 
 “I have more Polynesian than Popa’a acquaintances and friends… I have friends 
from Bordeaux who are here, visiting me. They are surprised because, well, from my 
job and my profession, I know all the parents… When I go to the store to buy bread it 
takes me three hours… You know everyone” (Kevin) 
His colleague, who arrived in Tahiti as an adolescent and is married to a local man, also 
feels different from other Mainlanders, choosing the “side” of Polynesians: 
 “Often people ask me if I was born here. I have a manner that makes people think I 
am from here. I feel more from here than from elsewhere… I don’t feel Popa’a.  I 
don’t feel Tahitian, but I feel it by adoption. And if I had to choose a side, I choose 
the side of the Tahitians. I am at home here” (Marie) 
Marie thus asserts allegiance to Tahiti and the Tahitian “side”, as opposed to identifying with 
Popa’a, toward whom she had earlier displayed hostility. 
The proudly integrated thus display a contrasting identity strategy in response to the 
ethnically salient social context encountered in Tahiti, strategy which involves distancing Self 
from one’s socially assigned and negatively stigmatised ethnicity. Much energy, in action and 
discourse, is thus allocated to displaying one’s difference from other Mainlanders and 
similarities with Polynesians. In reference to Frederik Barth’s fieldwork analysis, Jocelyne 
Streiff-Fenart notes that it can be advantageous to change one’s ethnic label “to avoid paying 
the price of defeat”14. In similar identity strategy, the proudly integrated avoid paying the 
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price of their assigned ethnic label by optimising the options available to them and identifying 
with an alternate ethnic label. 
 
3. The laissez-faire fatalist 
 
The reactions exhibited by the third ideal type, the laissez-faire fatalist, are a compromise 
between those of the proudly integrated and the embittered patriot. Like the latter, the laissez-
faire fatalist recognises ethnic divisions and the regretted impossibility to feel socially 
integrated among Polynesians, finding himself in a rather isolated ethnic community.  Yet in 
contrast he does not feel bitter or resentful of this, nor does he conversely try to adopt 
Polynesian ways or dissociate himself from Mainlanders. Accepting his social position and 
largely ignoring the negative ethnic stereotyping, he declares to live quite happily in Tahiti, 
despite the regretted barriers to inter-ethnic mélange. 
 
Recognition of regrettable ethnic divisions 
 
Firstly, the laissez-faire fatalist recognises ethnic divisions which he resigns to accept. A 
physical education teacher, who decided not to renew his contract after two initial years in 
Tahiti, attests to the presence of boundaries which maintain relations with Polynesians 
superficial. 
“The Polynesians are very nice; but from there to having deeper relations… In the 
neighbourhood where we live, all is going well. We always greet each other, but 
that’s it… It’s quite difficult to have real contact with the Tahitians. The reserve… It 
remains superficial. It’s not easy” (Norbert) 
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The reasons given for these divisions and for the superficiality of relations, rather than 
targeting individuals’ actions, are explained by socio-economic differences: 
“At kite-surfing… it’s an activity that costs a lot. So once again we are amongst 
ourselves… It’s related to money. If I can chat with the neighbours from one side it’s 
because they work; they both leave in the morning like us. Whereas on the other side, 
they don’t work; they fish, they sell fruit and fish by the side of the road… We don’t 
have the same culture, we don’t understand each other. It’s a different lifestyle” 
(Norbert) 
Norbert frequently justifies ethnic divisions by cultural differences, never praising or 
blaming one “side” or another. A university teacher, who requested keeping her position 
in Polynesia, also attests to superficiality in inter-ethnic relations: 
“It’s a different type of friendship… It’s a different culture… Later I distanced 
myself… it didn’t correspond to what I wanted. With Tahitians [I only had] 
superficial contacts… We stay on the outside… [There are] socio-economic 
differences, differences in interest…. [and] a huge gap between those who studied… 
Their culture is closed… it’s difficult to integrate… you have to make the effort… I 
think that there are two choices: either you integrate completely and take up the daily 
life of Tahitians, or you remain on the sidelines” (Olive) 
Once again the explications are neutral and accompanied by a resigned regret that relations 
with Tahitians are superficial and that such ethnic and cultural divisions exist. The 
acceptance of the role as foreigner permits acceptance of the divisions that the embittered 
patriot violently refuses: 
“I don’t want to impose… It’s their country, the country of the Tahitians. But it’s 
better that way… I try to do as they do, to respect the local codes; to not honk,… to 
yield to people even if it’s up to them to stop” (Olive) 
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She thus attributes her adaptation efforts to her accepted role as foreigner. 
A colleague, in Tahiti for ten years, has also accepted these divisions, living happily with 
wife and children in a convivial residential community. 
“The true friends are mostly Popa’a who have been here for a long time… At the 
beginning we had two couples of Polynesian friends [neighbours and their friends]… 
But since then, they moved to Moorea and we have more or less lost contact… It’s 
kind of a shame” (Paul) 
He regrets the lack of deepened contact with the host population, despite his long-term 
residence. Another colleague in her fifth year in Tahiti echoes this regret of ethnic boundaries. 
After discussing difficulties to integrate among Tahitians, she continues: 
“I tried to make contacts when I saw that the children had some Polynesian friends… 
They don’t make an effort because they know that they [Popa’a] are here to put 
money aside… [There are] obstacles for integration. We have different pastimes… 
parties, humour, and language too” (Quinn) 
Although also desiring deepened relationships, she notes that cultural differences produce 
natural obstacles to integration, in addition to the obstacle of the negative perception of Popa’a 
which is reinforced by the system of economic privileges. 
A middle school teacher who was recently authorised to keep his position in Tahiti 
confirms that the “boundaries” are difficult to penetrate and expresses a desire to adapt one 
day: 
“You must take the first step. And even when you take the first step, sometimes he 
assumes in any case you are just passing through, you do not interest him… 
Sometimes there is this retreat from the foreigner… I can’t say that I know the 
Polynesian culture as of now. I don’t really have the time to get into it. But I would 
like to get into it, either regarding to the language or the culture itself… But it is not 
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easy… I don’t feel rejected, but I don’t have the impression to be 100% integrated 
either. I hope it’ll come” (Ronald) 
Ronald thus recognises regrettable boundaries but preserves the hope that “integration” and 
improved contact will prevail with time. 
For a policeman beginning his second year in French Polynesia, the urban context of 
Papeete is responsible for the lack of inter-group contact: 
“We regret being in Papeete. I think that elsewhere it is easier to live well and 
amongst the Polynesians. In the islands there are less Popa’a; they are amongst them; 
they live together.  In Papeete, we have the impression to live on the sidelines” 
(Stéphane) 
This final statement is demonstrative of the laissez-faire fatalist’s overall feeling of regret for 
living “on the sidelines” and not amongst the Polynesians. 
 
Satisfaction with life in Tahiti 
 
Despite regrets toward ethnic boundaries, the laissez-faire fatalist makes the best of his 
situation in order to live well and take advantage of life in Polynesia. Some express this 
satisfaction by the desire to remain in the Territory beyond expiration of the temporary 
contract. Others articulate explicitly this satisfaction and feeling at home: 
“I don’t have the impression to live much differently than in the Mainland… I live 
with comfort, with a lot of happiness… There is a different culture, yes, but I don’t 
have the impression to be expatriated. I have the impression of being somewhere in 
France, as if I had gone from Brittany to the south of France” (Ronald) 
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Regardless of regretted ethnic divisions, the laissez-faire fatalist feels at home and lives in 
Polynesia “with a lot of happiness”. The following informant however demonstrates cynicism 
regarding his own integration in the system laid out for him: 
“I feel well. I don’t know… I have the impression that we are here to earn money, 
and that money is distributed across the Territory. We are a mailbox to take money 
and distribute it. If I am integrated, it is because I play my role as a mailbox: I pay a 
very expensive rent, etcetera. My social role here is more that than anything else. I 
think it’s the structure that is built that way” (Norbert) 
He associates his social role and integration directly with his professional role. 
Representing the French State, his social position is thus determined by the structure of 
relations between the State and the Territory. Yet, despite this predetermined social role, he 
nonetheless asserts to live happily in Tahiti. 
 
Similarities with other migrant populations 
 
The ideal types observed throughout this study have striking similarities with reactions 
and attitudes adopted by other migrant populations, in conditions of both socio-economic 
domination and marginalisation. Similarities have been found with the Maghreb population in 
France, with migrant elites in multinational companies and with the former French colonial 
population in Algeria. Each mainland French ideal type observed in this study resembles an 
ideal type of the comparative populations. 
Malewska-Peyre’s study regarding the Maghreb population in France highlights the fact 
that the individuals react diversely to the negative image of their ethnic belonging. “Over-
assertion” (“sur-affirmation”) 15 is one observed manner to combat the negative image, where 
the criticised characteristic is positively emphasised, as in the American “black is beautiful” 
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movement. This reaction clearly resembles the over-emphasis on French nationality in the 
case of the embittered patriot, who defends and positively reinforces this threatened aspect of 
his ethnic image. Similarly, in Philippe Pierre’s study (2003) regarding elite migrations and 
their identity strategies, migrants demonstrating this type of reaction are coined the 
“defensives” (“les defensives”) due to their strong defensiveness of the most criticised aspect 
of their group belonging. A similar ideal type exists in observations of colonial Algeria, in 
which Albert Memmi (1957) employs “the colonist who accepts his role” (“le colon qui 
s’accepte”) to term the individual who vigorously defends the legitimacy of his colonial 
presence. 
Regarding the proudly integrated, Malewska-Peyre and Camilleri designate such a 
reaction as “displacement”, where the migrant accepts the negative ethnic image yet distances 
his own image from the targeted group. Like the proudly integrated, the subject evacuates the 
devaluating injunction by assimilating to the dominant model, displacing the depreciated 
image upon other members of the ethnic group from which he would like to be distinguished 
(Camilleri 1989: 383). For Pierre, migrants expressing the proudly integrated reaction are 
termed ‘the converted” (“les convertis”), having changed their lifestyle and behaviour to 
assimilate to the dominant norms. Memmi correlates this type of reaction to “the colonist who 
refuses his role” (“le colon qui se refuse”), as he refuses colonial history and the concept of 
self as colonist or member of the dominant group. To contest this notion, the individual 
expressing this reaction type modulates his behaviour to illustrate this refusal, both to self or 
others.  
In Memmi’s binary ideal types, the laissez-faire fatalist is not represented. However 
Malewska-Peyre recognises this latter reaction as “repression”, the individual being aware of 
negative representations associated with his ethnic identity, yet choosing to ignore their 
existence. The migrant represses any pain provoked by prejudice in order to protect self-
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image and retain a decent quality of life. For their will to maintain a high quality of life within 
a foreign culture, Pierre terms those expressing this attitude “the opportunists” (“les 
opportunistes”) for their principal expression of pleasure in the discovery, change and travel 
associated with their migration.  
Overall, there are unmistakable similarities in identity strategy between the French 
expatriate experiences in Tahiti and those of other migrant or minority populations, all of 
whom strive to optimise their self image in light of the social depreciation of an ascribed 
identity. All of these identity “defence mechanisms” are in fact manners of preserving self 
esteem and value which are recognized by the psychoanalytical community. Anna Freud’s 
Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936) first elaborated some of these terms, such as 
“repression” or “displacement”, to describe some of these self-preservation strategies that we 
observe here on a widespread societal level in the face of negative identity representations. 
 
Conclusion:  common reactions to structural divisions 
 
The interviews indicate structural ethnic divisions, of which the difficulty of permeability 
provokes diverse reactions. These divisions are continually created and reinforced by the 
polarisation of ethnic perceptions, bringing social actors to choose “sides” and to divide 
ethnicity into “us” and “them”. Bruno Saura confirms such social barriers, stating “the 
‘popa’a’ minority […] can live in a closed circuit and in an almost completely autonomous 
manner in regards to the Polynesian population, as they occupy functions tied to French 
institutions and superstructures imported in Polynesia”. In light of these observable ethnic 
divisions, he adds that “Rather than trying to integrate or adapt to the territory and its 
inhabitants, the French minority takes advantage of the system” (Saura 1985: 9). The blame is 
thus placed on the will of the individual migrants. The persistence of this very stereotype, 
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however, complicates integration and adaptation of the migrant, regardless of individual will 
or professional role. 
The very definition of “ethnicity” is associated with the macro-social construction of 
groups, which precede the individual and yet which are continually reproduced by each 
individual. Marco Martiniello states that “ethnicity concerns the structural constraints of a 
social, economic and political nature which facet ethnic identities” (Martiniello 1995: 24), 
indicating that the polarisation of perceptions and groups generates constraints upon the 
individual’s ethnic identity and social interactions. As stated William Whyte regarding Italian 
integration within 1930’s American society, an Italian could not simply “become” American, 
due to the organisation of his own and the host society’s social groupings16. Similarly, macro-
social structural constraints facet the social position of Mainlanders in Tahiti, encouraging the 
adoption of identity strategies that place value on self identity within one’s difficultly 
escapable ethnic belonging. 
This study was limited to a sample of and did not investigate the attitudes and social 
integration of the full array of French migrants, including those retired, in the private sector or 
of second or third generation of residence. Within this specific context of temporary and elite 
arrivals of civil servants from mainland France, the latter position themselves differently 
around representations of their own ethnic group, the host population, colonial history and 
their social role as expatriated agent of the State. Striking points concerning the three 
communal reactions are: the demonstration of socially shared emotion, whether in the form of 
bitterness, pride or else proclaimed satisfaction; the widespread mechanisms of identity 
defence to conquer ethnic depreciation;) and the strong similarities between this community’s 
emotional reactions and identity strategies with those of other communities subject to 
negative ethnic association.  
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Contrary to expectation, the overall attitudes types displayed were independent of length 
of stay. The accounts of ethnic “boundaries” across the range of ideal types and stay-lengths 
suggest that the continual arrival and presence of temporary migrants assist in reinforcing the 
divided social structure and continually reconstructed ethnic “boundaries”, especially as 
assimilation and integration seem to occur in the long term, over generations (Alba 2003: 34).  
Rather than forming a “neo-Polynesian” society whose political proponents strive to find a 
“permanent and daily mélange of cultures […] and not just a juxtaposition of cultures within 
the same territory” (Saura 1986: 236), polarisation of ethnic identity and negative ethnic 
representations appear exacerbated within the current organisation. In consequence, 
omnipresent in the discourse of current-day expatriated civil servants in Tahiti are “colonial 
guilt” and negative stigma, which are either asserted, assumed, transposed or ignored in each 
migrant’s quest to construct a favourable individual identity within a socially and individually 
credible ethnic belonging. 
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